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Abstract—In this paper, we identify a new form of attack,
called the Balance attack, against proof-of-work blockchain
systems. The novelty of this attack consists of delaying network
communications between multiple subgroups of nodes with bal-
anced mining power. Our theoretical analysis captures the precise
tradeoff between the network delay and the mining power of
the attacker needed to double spend in Ethereum with high
probability.
We quantify our probabilistic analysis with statistics taken
from the R3 consortium, and show that a single machine
needs 20 minutes to attack the consortium. Finally, we run an
Ethereum private chain in a distributed system with similar
settings as R3 to demonstrate the feasibility of the approach,
and discuss the application of the Balance attack to Bitcoin.
Our results clearly confirm that main proof-of-work blockchain
protocols can be badly suited for consortium blockchains.
Keywords: Ethereum; proof-of-work, GHOST, Chernoff bounds
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain systems are distributed implementations of a
chain of blocks. Each node can issue a cryptographically
signed transaction to transfer digital assets to another node or
can create a new block of transactions, by solving a crypto-
puzzle, and append this block to its current view of the chain.
Due to the distributed nature of this task, multiple nodes may
append distinct blocks at the same index of the chain before
learning about the presence of other blocks, hence leading to
a forked chain or a tree. For nodes to eventually agree on a
unique state of the system, nodes apply a common strategy
that selects a unique branch of blocks in this tree.
Bitcoin [23], one of the most popular blockchain systems,
selects the longest branch. This strategy has however shown
its limitation as it simply wastes all blocks not present in
this branch [9], [27], [29], [15], [25]. If an attacker can
solve crypto-puzzles fast enough to grow a local branch of
the blockchain faster than the rest of the system, then it
will eventually impose its own branch to all participants.
In particular, by delaying the propagation of blocks in the
system, one can increase the amount of wasted blocks and
proportionally slow down the growth of the longest branch of
the system. This delay presents a serious risk to the integrity
of the blockchain, as the attacker does not even need a large
fraction of the computational power to exceed the length of
the chain, allowing her to double spend in new transactions
the coins that she already spent in earlier transactions [28].
Ethereum [32] proposes another selection strategy that
copes with this problem. Each node uses an algorithm, called
GHOST, that starts from the first block, also called the genesis
block, and iteratively selects the root of the heaviest subtree
to construct the common branch. Even if nodes create many
blocks at the same index of the blockchain, their computational
power is not wasted but counted in the selection strategy [29].
In particular, the number of these “sibling” blocks increase the
chance that their common ancestor block be selected in favor
of another candidate block mined by the attacker. Although
it clearly alleviates the Bitcoin limitation discussed above [9],
[27], [15], [25] it remains unclear how long an attacker with a
low mining power should delay messages to discard previous
transactions in Ethereum.
In this paper, we answer this question by demonstrating
theoretically and experimentally that an attacker can compen-
sate a low mining power by delaying selected messages in
Ethereum. To this end, we propose a simple attack, called the
Balance Attack: an attacker transiently disrupts communica-
tions between subgroups of similar mining power. During this
time, the attacker issues transactions in one subgroup, say the
transaction subgroup, and mines blocks in another subgroup,
say the block subgroup, up to the point where the tree of the
block subgroup outweighs, with high probability, the tree of
the transaction subgroup. The novelty of the Balance attack
is to leverage the GHOST protocol that accounts for sibling
or uncle blocks to select a chain of blocks. This strategy
allows the attacker to mine a branch possibility in isolation
of the rest of the network before merging its branch to one
of the competing blockchain to influence the branch selection
process.
We experimented a distributed system running Ethereum
in similar settings as R3, a consortium of more than 70
world-wide financial institutions. In January, R3 consisted
of eleven banks and successfully collaborated in deploying
an Ethereum private chain to perform transactions.1 Since
then, R3 has grown and kept experimenting Ethereum2 and
other technologies while the concept of consortium private
1http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/r3-connects-11-banks-distributed-ledger-using-
ethereum-microsoft-azure-1539044.
2http://www.coindesk.com/r3-ethereum-report-banks/.
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chain gained traction for its ability to offer a blockchain
system among multiple companies in a private and controlled
environment. R3 has just released their own Corda framework.
As opposed to a fully private chain scenario, the consortium
private chain involves different institutions possibly competing
among each other. As they can be located at different places
around the world, they typically use Internet to communicate.
We illustrate the Balance attack in the R3 testbed setting as of
June 2016, by deploying our own private chain on 15 mining
virtual machines in Emulab and configuring the network with
ns-2.
While disrupting the communication between subgroups of
a blockchain system may look difficult, there have been some
attacks successfully delaying messages of Bitcoin in the past.
In 2014, a BGP hijacker exploited access to an ISP to steal
$83000 worth of bitcoins by positioning itself between Bitcoin
pools and their miners [19]. Some known attacks against
Bitcoin involved partitioning the communication graph at the
network level [1] and at the application level [17]. At the
network level, a study indicated the simplicity for autonomous
systems to intercept a large amount of bitcoins and evaluated
the impact of these network attacks on the Bitcoin protocol [1].
At the application level, some work showed that an attacker
controlling 32 IP addresses can “eclipse” a Bitcoin node with
85% probability [17]. More generally, man-in-middle attacks
can lead to similar results by relaying the traffic between two
nodes through the attacker.
One can exploit the Balance attack to violate the persistence
of the main branch, hence rewriting previously committed
transactions, and allowing the attacker to double spend. As
opposed to previous attacks against Bitcoin where the attacker
has to expand the longest chain faster than correct miners to
obtain this result [28], the novelty of our attack lies in the
contribution of the attacker to one of the correct miner chain
in order to outweigh another correct miner chain of Ethereum.
We generalize our contribution to proof-of-work algorithms
by proposing a simple model for proof-of-work blockchains
and specifying Nakamoto’s and GHOST consensus algorithmic
differences. We also discuss how to adapt the Balance attack to
violate the persistence of Bitcoin main branch. This adaptation
requires to mine at the top of one of the correct chains
rather than solo-mining a subchain but can lead to similar
consequences. More precisely, we make the four following
contributions:
1) We show that the GHOST consensus protocol can be
vulnerable to a double spending attack without coali-
tion and with high probability if a single attacker can
delay communication between multiple communication
subgraphs while owning 5% of the total mining power
of the system.
2) We illustrate the problem in the context of the R3
consortium blockchain, as of June 2016, where we
observed 50 nodes among which 15 were mining. We
show that one of the nodes can execute a Balance attack
by disrupting some communication channels less than 4
minutes.
3) We demonstrate a tradeoff between the mining power
needed and the time selected communication channels
have to be delayed to attack Ethereum. This suggests that
combining network-level with application-level attacks
increases the Ethereum vulnerability.
4) We generalize this result to Nakamoto’s protocol and
propose an adaptation of the Balance attack to double
spend in Bitcoin if the attacker can contribute, even with
a small power, by mining on top of some of the correct
chains.
Section II defines the problem. In Section III, we present
the algorithm to run the attack. In Section IV, we show how
the analysis affects GHOST. In Section V, we simulate a
Balance attack in the context of the R3 consortium network.
In Section VI, we present our experiments run in an Ethereum
private chain. In Section VII, we discuss the implications of the
attack in existing blockchain systems. Section VIII presents the
related work. And Section IX concludes. Appendix A includes
the missing proofs for the general case.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we model a simple distributed system as
a communication graph that implements a blockchain ab-
straction as a directed acyclic graph. We propose a high-
level pseudocode representation of proof-of-work blockchain
protocols in this model that allows us to illustrate an important
difference between Bitcoin and Ethereum in the selection of
a main branch with a persistent prefix.
A. A simple distributed model for blockchains
We consider a communication graph G = 〈V,E〉 with
nodes V connected to each other through fixed commu-
nication links E. Nodes are part of a blockchain system
S ∈ {bitcoin, ethereum} and can act as clients by issuing
transactions to the system and/or servers by mining, the action
of trying to combine transactions into a block. For the sake
of simplicity, we consider that each node possesses a single
account and that a transaction issued by node pi is a transfer of
digital assets or coins from the account of the source node pi
to the account of a destination node pj 6= pi. Each transaction
is uniquely identified and broadcast to all nodes in a best-effort
manner. We assume that a node re-issuing the same transfer
multiple times creates as many distinct transactions.
Nodes that mine are called miners. We refer to the computa-
tional power of a miner as its mining power and we denote the
total mining power t as the sum of the mining powers of all
miners in V . Each miner tries to group a set T of transactions it
heard about into a block b ⊇ T as long as transactions of T do
not conflict and that the account balances remain non-negative.
For the sake of simplicity in the presentation, the graph G is
static meaning that no nodes can join and leave the system,
however, nodes may fail as described in Section II-A2.
1) Miner must solve a crypto-puzzle to create a new block:
Miners provably solve a hashcash crypto-puzzle [3] before
creating a new block. Given a global threshold and the block
of largest index the miner knows, the miner repeatedly selects
2
(a) view `1 (b) view `2 (c) view `3 (d) global state `0 =
`1 ∪ `2 ∪ `3
Fig. 1: The global state `0 of a blockchain results from the
union of the distributed local views `1, `2 and `3 of the
blockchain
a nonce and applies a pseudo-random function to this block
and the selected nonce until it obtains a result lower than
the threshold. Upon success the miner creates a block that
contains the successful nounce as a proof-of-work as well as
the hash of the previous block, hence fixing the index of the
block, and broadcasts the block. As there is no known strategy
to solve the crypto-puzzle, the miners simply keep testing
whether randomly chosen numbers solve the crypto-puzzle.
The mining power is thus expressed in the number of hashes
the miner can test per second, or H/s for short. The difficulty
of this crypto-puzzle, defined by the threshold, limits the rate
at which new blocks can be generated by the network. In the
remainder, we refer to d as the difficulty of this crypto-puzzle.
2) The failure model: We assume the presence of an
adversary (or attacker) that can control nodes that together
own a relatively small fraction ρ < 0.5 of the total mining
power of the system. The nodes controlled by the adversary are
called malicious and may not follow the protocol specification,
however, they cannot impersonate other nodes while issuing
transactions.3 A node that is not malicious is correct. We also
assume that the adversary can transiently disrupt communica-
tions on a selected subset of edges E0 of the communication
graph G.
3) The blockchain abstraction: Let the blockchain be a
directed acyclic graph (DAG) ` = 〈B,P 〉 such that blocks of
B point to each other with pointers P (pointers are recorded
in a block as a hash of the previous block) and a special block
g ∈ B, called the genesis block, does not point to any block.
Algorithm 1 Blockchain construction at node pi
1: `i = 〈Bi, Pi〉, the local blockchain at node pi is a directed acyclic
2: graph of blocks Bi and pointers Pi
3: receive-blocks(〈Bj , Pj〉)i:  upon reception of blocks
4: Bi ← Bi ∪Bj  update vertices of blockchain
5: Pi ← Pi ∪ Pj  update edges of blockchain
Algorithm 1 describes the progressive construction of the
blockchain at a particular node pi upon reception of blocks
from other nodes by simply aggregating the newly received
blocks to the known blocks (lines 3–5). As every added block
3This is typically ensured through public key crypto-systems.
contains a hash to a previous block that eventually leads back
to the genesis block, each block is associated with a fixed
index. By convention we consider the genesis block at index
0, and the blocks at k hops away from the genesis block as
the blocks at index k. As an example, consider the simple
blockchain `1 = 〈B1, P1〉 depicted in Figure 1(a) where B1 =
{g, b1} and P1 = {〈b1, g〉}. The genesis block g has index 0
and the block b1 has index 1.
4) Forks as disagreements on the blocks at a given index:
As depicted by views `1, `2 and `3 in Figures 1(a), 1(b)
and 1(c), respectively, nodes may have a different views of
the current state of the blockchain. In particular, it is possible
for two miners p1 and p2 to mine almost simultaneously two
different blocks, say b1 and b2. If neither block b1 nor b2
was propagated early enough to nodes p2 and p1, respectively,
then both blocks would point to the same previous block g as
depicted in Figures 1(a) and 1(b). Because network delays are
not predictable, a third node p3 may receive the block b1 and
mine a new block without hearing about b2. The three nodes
p1, p2 and p3 thus end up having three different local views of
the same blockchain, denoted `1 = 〈B1, P1〉, `2 = 〈B2, P2〉
and `3 = 〈B3, P3〉.
We refer to the global blockchain as the directed acyclic
graph `0 = 〈B0, P0〉 representing the union of these local
blockchain views, denoted by `1∪`2∪`3 for short, as depicted
in Figure 1, and more formally defined as follows:{
B0 = ∪∀iBi,
P0 = ∪∀iPi.
The point where distinct blocks of the global blockchain DAG
have the same predecessor block is called a fork. As an
example Figure 1(d) depicts a fork with two branches pointing
to the same block: g in this example.
In the remainder of this paper, we refer to the DAG as a
tree rooted in g with upward pointers, where children blocks
point to their parent block.
5) Main branch in Bitcoin and Ethereum: To resolve the
forks and define a deterministic state agreed upon by all nodes,
a blockchain system must select a main branch, as a unique se-
quence of blocks, based on the tree. Building upon the generic
construction (Alg. 1), we present two selections: Nakamoto’s
consensus protocol (Alg. 2) present in Bitcoin [23] and the
GHOST consensus protocol (Alg. 3) present in Ethereum [32].
a) Nakamoto’s consensus algorithm: The difficulty of
the crypto-puzzles used in Bitcoin produces a block every 10
minutes in expectation. The advantage of this long period, is
that it is relatively rare for the blockchain to fork because
blocks are rarely mined during the time others are propagated
to the rest of the nodes.
Algorithm 2 depicts the Bitcoin-specific pseudocode that
includes Nakamoto’s consensus protocol to decide on a partic-
ular block at index i (lines 8–18) and the choice of parameter
m (line 6) explained later in Section II-B. When a fork occurs,
Nakamoto’s protocol resolves it by selecting the deepest
branch as the main branch (lines 8–15) by iteratively selecting
the root of the deepest subtree (line 11). When process pi is
3
Algorithm 2 Nakamoto’s consensus protocol at node pi
6: m = 5, the number of blocks to be appended after the block containing
7: tx , for tx to be committed in Bitcoin
8: get-main-branch()i:  select the longest branch
9: b← genesis-block(Bi)  start from the blockchain root
10: while b.children 6= ∅ do  prune shortest branches
11: block ← argmaxc∈b.children{depth(c)}  root of deepest subtree
12: B ← B ∪ {block}  update vertices of main branch
13: P ← P ∪ {〈block , b〉}  update edges of main branch
14: b← block  move to next block
15: return 〈B,P 〉  returning the Bitcoin main branch
16: depth(b)i:  depth of tree rooted in b
17: if b.children = ∅ then return 1  stop at leaves
18: else return 1 + maxc∈b.children depth(c)  recurse at children
done with this pruning, the resulting branch becomes the main
branch 〈Bi, Pi〉 as observed by the local process pi. Note that
the pseudocode for checking whether a block is decided and a
transaction committed based on this parameter m is common
to Bitcoin and Ethereum, it is thus deferred to Alg. 4.
6) The GHOST consensus algorithm: As opposed to the
Bitcoin protocol, Ethereum generates one block every 12–15
seconds. While it improves the throughput (transactions per
second) it also favors transient forks as miners are more likely
to propose new blocks without having heard about the latest
mined blocks yet. To avoid wasting large mining efforts while
resolving forks, Ethereum uses the GHOST (Greedy Heaviest
Observed Subtree) consensus algorithm that accounts for the,
so called uncles, blocks of discarded branches. In contrast with
Nakamoto’s protocol, the GHOST protocol iteratively selects,
as the successor block, the root of the subtree that contains
the largest number of nodes (cf. Algorithm 3).
Fig. 2: Nakamoto’s consensus protocol at the heart of
Bitcoin selects the main branch as the deepest branch (in
black) whereas the GHOST consensus protocol at the heart of
Ethereum follows the heaviest subtree (in grey)
The main difference between Nakamoto’s consensus pro-
tocol and GHOST is depicted in Figure 2, where the black
blocks represent the main branch selected by Nakamoto’s
consensus protocol and the grey blocks represent the main
branch selected by GHOST.
Algorithm 3 The GHOST consensus protocol at node pi
6: m = 11, the number of blocks to be appended after the block containing
7: tx , for tx to be committed in Ethereum (since Homestead v1.3.5)
8: get-main-branch()i:  select the branch with the most nodes
9: b← genesis-block(Bi)  start from the blockchain root
10: while b.children 6= ∅ do  prune lightest branches
11: block ← argmaxc∈b.children{num-desc(c)}  root of heaviest tree
12: B ← B ∪ {block}  update vertices of main branch
13: P ← P ∪ {〈block , b〉}  update edges of main branch
14: b← block  move to next block
15: return 〈B,P 〉.  returning the Ethereum main branch
16: num-desc(b)i:  number of nodes in tree rooted in b
17: if b.children = ∅ then return 1  stop at leaves
18: else return 1 +
∑
c∈b.children num-desc(c)  recurse at children
B. Decided blocks and committed transactions
A blockchain system S must define when the block at an
index is agreed upon. To this end, it has to define a point
in its execution where a prefix of the main branch can be
“reasonably” considered as persistent.4 More precisely, there
must exist a parameter m provided by S for an application to
consider a block as decided and its transactions as committed.
This parameter is typically mbitcoin = 5 in Bitcoin (Alg. 2,
line 6) and methereum = 11 in Ethereum (Alg. 3, line 6).
Definition 1 (Transaction commit). Let `i = 〈Bi, Pi〉 be the
blockchain view at node pi in system S. For a transaction tx
to be locally committed at pi, the conjunction of the following
properties must hold in pi’s view `i:
1) Transaction tx has to be in a block b0 ∈ Bi of the main
branch of system S. Formally, tx ∈ b0 ∧ b0 ∈ B′i : ci =
〈B′i, P ′i 〉 = get-main-branch()i.
2) There should be a subsequence of m blocks b1, ..., bm
appended after block b. Formally, ∃b1, ..., bm ∈ Bi :
〈b1, b0〉, 〈b2, b1〉, ..., 〈bm, bm−1〉 ∈ Pi. (In short, we say
that b0 is decided.)
A transaction tx is committed if there exists a node pi such
that tx is locally committed.
Property (1) is needed because nodes eventually agree on
the main branch that defines the current state of accounts
in the system—blocks that are not part of the main branch
are ignored. Property (2) is necessary to guarantee that the
blocks and transactions currently in the main branch will
persist and remain in the main branch. Before these additional
blocks are created, nodes may not have reached consensus
regarding the unique blocks b at index j in the chain. This
is illustrated by the fork of Figure 1 where nodes consider,
respectively, the pointer 〈b1, g〉 and the pointer 〈b2, g〉 in their
local blockchain view. By waiting for m blocks were m is
given by the blockchain system, the system guarantees with a
reasonably high probability that nodes will agree on the same
block b.
4In theory, there cannot be consensus on a block at a partiular index [13],
hence preventing persistence, however, applications have successfully used
Ethereum to transfer digital assets based on parameter methereum = 11 [24].
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Algorithm 4 Checking transaction commit at node pi
19: is-committed(tx)i:  check whether transaction is committed
20: 〈B′i, P ′i 〉 ← get-main-branch()  pick main branch with Alg. 2 or 3
21: if ∃b0 ∈ B′i : tx ∈ b0 ∧ ∃b1, ..., bm ∈ Bi :  tx in main branch
22: 〈b1, b0〉, 〈b2, b1〉..., 〈bm, bm−1〉 ∈ Pi then  enough blocks
23: return true
24: else return false
For example, consider a fictive blockchain system with
mfictive = 2 that selects the heaviest branch (Alg. 3, lines 8–
15) as its main branch. If the blockchain state was the one
depicted in Figure 2, then blocks b2 and b5 would be decided
and all their transactions would be committed. This is because
they are both part of the main branch and they are followed by
at least 2 blocks, b8 and b13. (Note that we omit the genesis
block as it is always considered decided but does not include
any transaction.)
III. THE BALANCE ATTACK
In this section, we present the Balance attack, a novel form
of attacks that affect proof-of-work blockchains, especially
Ethereum. Its novelty lies in identifying subgroups of miners
of equivalent mining power and delaying messages between
them rather than entering a race to mine blocks faster than
others.
The balance attack demonstrates a fundamental limitation of
main proof-of-work systems in that they are block oblivious.
Definition 2 (Block Obliviousness). A blockchain system is
block oblivious if an attacker can:
1) make the recipient of a transaction tx observe that tx
is committed and
2) later remove the transaction tx from the main branch,
with a probability 1− ε, where ε is a small constant.
The balance attack is simple: after the attacker introduces a
delay between correct subgroups of equivalent mining power,
it simply issues transactions in one subgroup. The attacker
then mines sufficiently many blocks in another subgroup
to ensure with high probability that the subtree of another
subgroup outweighs the transaction subgroup’s. Even though
the transactions are committed, the attacker can rewrite with
high probability the blocks that contain these transactions by
outweighing the subtree containing this transaction.
Note that one could benefit from delaying messages only be-
tween the merchant and the rest of the network by applying the
eclipse attack [17] to Ethereum. Eclipsing one node of Bitcoin
appeared, however, sufficiently difficult: it requires to restart
the node’s protocol in order to control all the logical neighbors
the node will eventually try to connect to. While a Bitcoin
node typically connects to 8 logical neighbors, an Ethereum
node typically connects to 25 nodes, making the problem
even harder. Another option would be to isolate a subgroup
of smaller mining power than another subgroup, however, it
would make the attack only possible if the recipients of the
transactions are located in the subgroup of smaller mining
power. Although possible this would limit the generality of
(a) Example of the selection of
edges E0 delayed between k = 2
subgraphs of 25 units of mining
power each
(b) Example of the selection of edges
E0 delayed between k = 4 subgraphs
of 12 units of mining power each
Fig. 3: Two decompositions of communication graphs into
subgraphs by an attacker where E0 represents the cut of
communication edges linking the subgraphs
the attack, because the attacker would be constrained on the
transactions it can override.
Note that the Balance Attack inherently violates the per-
sistence of the main branch prefix and is enough for the
attacker to double spend. The attacker has simply to identify
the subgroup that contains merchants and create transactions
to buy goods from these merchants. After that, it can issue
the transactions to this subgroup while propagating its mined
blocks to at least one of the other subgroups. Once the
merchant shipped goods, the attacker stops delaying messages.
Based on the high probability that the tree seen by the
merchant is outweighed by another subtree, the attacker could
reissue another transaction transferring the exact same coin
again.
A. Executing a Balance Attack
For the sake of simplicity, let us fix k = 2 and postpone
the general analysis for any k ≥ 2 to Appendix A. We
consider subgraphs G1 = 〈V1, E1〉 and G2 = 〈V2, E2〉 of
the communication graph G = 〈V,E〉 so that each subgraph
has half of the mining power of the system as depicted in
Figure 3(a) whereas Figure 3(a) illustrates the variant when
k = 4. Let E0 = E \ (E1 ∪ E2) be the set of edges that
connects nodes of V1 to nodes of V2 in the original graph G.
Let τ be the communication delay introduced by the attacker
on the edges of E0.
As indicated in Algorithm 5, the attacker can introduce a
sufficiently long delay τ during which the miners of G1 mine
in isolation of the miners of G2 (line 13). As a consequence,
different transactions get committed in different series of
blocks on the two blockchains locally viewed by the subgraphs
G1 and G2. Let b2 be a block present only in the blockchain
viewed by G2 but absent from the blockchain viewed by G1. In
the meantime, the attacker issues transactions spending coins
C in G1 (line 14) and mines a blockchain starting from the
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Algorithm 5 The Balance Attack initiated by attacker pi
1: State:
2: G = 〈V,E〉, the communication graph
3: pow, a mapping from of a node in V to its mining power in R
4: `i = 〈Bi, Pi〉, the local blockchain at node pi is a directed acyclic
5: graph of blocks Bi and pointers Pi
6: ρ ∈ (0; 1), the portion of the mining power of the system owned by
7: the attacker pi, typically ρ < 0.5
8: d, the difficulty of the crypto-puzzle currently used by the system
9: balance-attack(〈V,E〉)i:  starts the attack
10: Select k ≥ 2 subgraphs G1 = 〈V1, E1〉, ..., Gk = 〈Vk, Ek〉:
11:
∑
∀v∈V1 pow(v) ≈ ... ≈
∑
∀v′∈Vk pow(v
′)
12: Let E0 = E \ ∪∀0<i≤kEi  attack communication channels
13: Stop communications on E0 during τ ≥ (1−ρ)6d log(
4
ε
)
4ρ2t
seconds
14: Issue transaction tx crediting a merchant in graph Gi with coins C
15: Let b2 be a block appearing in Gj but not in Gi
16: Start mining on `i immediately after b2  contributed to correct chain
17: Send blockchain view `i to some subgraph Gj where j 6= i
18: When τ seconds have elapsed, stop delaying communications on E0
19: Issue transaction tx ′ that double spends coins C
block b2 (line 16). Before the delay expires the attacker sends
his blockchain to G2. After the delay expires, the two local
views of the blockchain are exchanged. Once the heaviest
branch that the attacker contributed to is adopted, the attacker
can simply reuse the coins C in new transactions (line 19).
B. The knowledge about the network
As indicated by the state of Algorithm 5, an attacker has to
be knowledgeable about the current settings of the blockchain
system to execute a Balance attack. In fact, the attacker must
have information regarding the logical or physical communica-
tion graph, the mining power of the miners or pools of miners
and the current difficulty of the crypto-puzzle. In particular,
this information is needed to delay messages for long enough
between selected communication subgraphs. As we will show
in the next section, this delay can be overestimated, however,
underestimating it may make the attack impossible.
The information regarding the mining power and the diffi-
culty of nodes is generally public information and can often be
retrieved online. In particular, we got provided an access to the
R3 Ethereum network statistics http://r3n1-utils.gcl.r3cev.com/
that included block propagation delays, the list of connected
nodes and their individual mining power, the version of
their Ethereum client as well as the current difficulty of
the crypto-puzzle. The same statistical information regarding
the Ethereum public chain is publicly available online at
https://ethstats.net/.
It is more difficult, however, to gather information regarding
the communication network. Note that some tools exist to
retrieve information regarding the communication topology of
blockchain systems. The interesting aspects of the Balance
attack is that it can apply to the logical overlay used by
the peer-to-peer network of the blockchain system or to
the physical overlay. While there exist tools to retrieve the
logical overlay topology, like AddressProbe [21] to find some
information regarding the peer-to-peer overlay of Bitcoin, it
can be easier for an attacker of Ethereum to run a DNS
poisoinning or a denial-of-service attack rather than a BGP
hijacking [19], [1] that requires access to autonomous systems.
IV. VULNERABILITY OF THE GHOST PROTOCOL
In this Section, we show that the Balance attack makes a
blockchain system based on GHOST (depicted in Alg. 3) block
oblivious. A malicious user can issue a Balance attack with
less than half of the mining power by delaying the network.
Let us first summarize previous and new notations in Table I.
t total mining power of the system (in million hashes per second, MH/s)
d difficulty of the crypto-puzzle (in million hashes, MH)
ρ fraction of the mining power owned by the malicious miner (in percent, %)
k the number of communication subgraphs
τ time during which communication between subgraphs is disrupted (in seconds, s)
µc mean of the number of blocks mined by each communication subgraph during τ
µm mean of the number of blocks mined by the attacker during time τ
∆ the maximum difference of mined blocks for the two subgraphs
TABLE I: Notations of the analysis
For the sake of simplicity in the proof, we assume that
k = 2 and
∑
∀v∈V1 pow(v) =
∑
∀v′∈V2 pow(v
′) so that the
communication is delayed between only two communication
subgraphs of equal mining power. We defer the proof for the
general case where k ≥ 2 to Appendix A.
As there is no better strategy for solving the crypto-puzzles
than random trials, we consider that subgraphs G1 and G2
mine blocks during delay τ . During that time, each of G1
and G2 performs a series of n = 1−ρk tτ independent and
identically distributed Bernoulli trials that returns one in case
of success with probability p = 1d and 0 otherwise. Let
the sum of these outcomes for subgraphs G1 and G2 be
the random variables X1 and X2, respectively, each with a
binomial distribution and mean:
µc = np =
(1− ρ)tτ
2d
. (1)
Similarly, the mean of the number of blocks mined by the
malicious miner during time τ is
µm =
ρtτ
d
.
From line 13 of Alg. 5, we know that τ ≥ (1−ρ)6d log( 4ε )4ρ2t
which leads to:
τ ≥ (1− ρ)6d log(
4
ε )
4ρ2t
,
(1− ρ)tτ
2d
≥ 3(1− ρ)
2 log( 4ε )
4ρ2
.
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Fig. 4: The mining power of the R3 Ethereum network as reported by eth-netstats as of June 2016
By Eq. 4 we have:
µc ≥
3(1− ρ)2 log( 4ε )
4ρ2
,
4ρ2µc
3(1− ρ)2 ≥ log
(
4
ε
)
,
− 4ρ
2µc
3(1− ρ)2 ≤ log
(ε
4
)
,
e
− 4ρ2µc
3(1−ρ)2 ≤ ε
4
,
1− 4e−
4ρ2µc
3(1−ρ)2 ≥ 1− ε. (2)
The attack relies on minimizing the difference in mined
blocks between any pair of communication subgraphs.
Lemma 3. After the communication is re-enabled, the expec-
tation of the number of blocks mined by the attacker is greater
than the difference ∆ = |X1 − X2| of the number of blocks
mined on the two subgraphs G1 and G2, with probability 1−ε.
Proof: The communication is re-enabled at line 18 of
Alg. 5. At this point in the execution, the probability that the
numbers of blocks mined by each subgraph are within a ±δ
factor from their mean, is bound for 0 < δ < 1 and i ∈ {1, 2}
by Chernoff bounds [22]:{
Pr [Xi ≥ (1 + δ)µc] ≤ e− δ
2
3 µc ,
Pr [Xi ≤ (1− δ)µc] ≤ e− δ
2
2 µc .
Thus, we have
Pr[|Xi − µc| < δµc] > 1− 2e− δ
2
3 µc .
Observe that the probability that these two random variables
are both within a ±δµc is lower than the probability that their
difference ∆ is upper-bounded by 2δµc:
(Pr [|Xi − µc| < δµc])2 ≤ Pr[∆ < 2δµc].
Thus, we obtain:
Pr[∆ < 2δµc] >
(
1− 2e− δ
2
3 µc
)2
. (3)
As µc ≥ 0, we have that:
−δ
2
3
µc ≤ 0,
−e−δ
2
3 µc ≥ −1,
and we can apply the Bernoulli inequality to Eq. 3:
Pr[∆ < 2δµc] > 1− 4e− δ
2
3 µc .
If we replace δ by 2ρ1−ρ , we obtain:
Pr[∆ < µm] > 1− 4e−
4ρ2µc
3(1−ρ)2 .
By Eq. 2, we can see that the expectation of the number of
blocks mined by the attacker is strictly greater than ∆ with
high probability:
Pr[∆ < µm] > 1− ε.
Theorem 4. A blockchain system that selects a main branch
based on the GHOST protocol (Alg. 3) is block oblivious.
Proof: By lines 17–18 of Alg. 3, we know that GHOST
counts every mined blocks to compute the weight of a subtree,
and to select one blockchain view and discard the other.
Since the expected number of blocks mined by the attacker
is greater than the difference ∆ with probability 1−ε, we know
that when the timer expires at line 18 of Alg. 5, the attacker
will make the system discard the blockchain view of either G1
or G2 by sending its blockchain view to the other subgraph,
hence making the blockchain system block oblivious.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE R3 TESTBED
The statistics of the R3 testbed were gathered through the
eth-netstat applications at the end of June 2016.5 R3 is a
consortium of more than 50 banks that has tested blockchain
systems and in particular Ethereum in a consortium private
chain context over 2016.6 As depicted in Figure 4, the network
consisted at that time of |V | = 50 nodes among which only
15 were mining. The mining power of the system was about
20 MH/s and the most powerful miner mines at 2.4 MH/s or
12% of the total mining power while the difficulty of the
crypto-puzzle was observed close to 30 MH.
We assume that the attacker selects communication edges
E0 between two subgraphs G1 and G2 so that their mining
power is 8.8 MH/s each. The probability p of solving the
crypto-puzzle per hash tested is 130×106 so that the mean is
5http://r3n1-utils.gcl.r3cev.com/.
6http://www.coindesk.com/r3-ethereum-report-banks
7
Number of nodes 50
Number of miners 15
Total mining power (MH/s) 20
Mining power of the most powerful miner (MH/s) 2.4
Difficulty (MH) 30
TABLE II: The R3 settings used in the analysis
µc = np = 95.3 if we wait for 19 minutes and 40 seconds.
The attacker creates, in expectation, a block every 302.4 = 12.5
seconds or b 118012.5 c = 94 blocks during the 19 minutes and
40 seconds. Hence let us select δ such that the attacker has
a chance to mine more than 2δµc blocks during that period,
i.e., 94 = 2δµc + 1 implying that δ = 0.1343. The probability
of the difference exceeding 94 is upper bounded by 4e−
δ2
3 µc
leading to a bound of 49.86%.
To conclude a single miner of the R3 testbed needs to delay
edges of E0 during less than 20 minutes to execute a Balance
attack and discards blocks that were previously decided (even
if m = 18 was chosen) with a chance of success greater than
1
2 .
A. Tradeoff between communication delays and mining power
Malicious nodes may have an incentive to form a coalition
in order to exploit the Balance attack to double spend. In
this case, it is easier for the malicious nodes to control a
larger portion of the mining power of the system, hence such
a coalition would not need to delay messages as long as in
our example of Section V. For simplicity, we again consider
the case where the attacker delay messages between k = 2
communication subgraphs.
To illustrate the tradeoff between communication delay and
the portion of the mining power controlled by the attacker,
we consider the R3 testbed with a 30 MH total difficulty, a
20 MH/s total mining power and plot the probability as the
communication delay increases for different portions of the
mining power controlled by the adversary. Figure 5 depicts
this result. As expected, the probability increases exponentially
fast as the delay increases, and the higher the portion of the
mining power is controlled by the adversary the faster the
probability increases. In particular, in order to issue a balance
attack with 90% probability, 51 minutes are needed for an
adversary controlling 12% of the total mining power whereas
only 11 minutes are sufficient for an adversary who controls
20% of the mining power.
B. Tradeoff between communication delays and difficulties
Another interesting aspect of proof-of-work blockchain is
the difficulty parameter d. As already mentioned, this param-
eter impacts the expected time it takes for a miner to succeed
in solving the crypto-puzzle. When setting up a private chain,
one has to choose a difficulty to make sure the miners would
mine at a desirable pace. A too high difficulty reduces the
throughput of the system without requiring leader election [10]
or consensus sharding [20]. A too low difficulty increases the
probability for two correct miners to solve the crypto-puzzle
Fig. 5: Probability of Balance attack in the R3 testbed as the
communication delay increases for different portions of the
mining power controlled by the attacker
before one can propagate the block to the other, a problem of
Bitcoin that motivated the GHOST protocol [29].
Fig. 6: Probability of Balance attack in the R3 testbed (with
20 MH/s of total mining power, 12% of the mining power at
the attacker) for different difficulties as the communication
delay increases
Figure 6 depicts the probability of the Blockchain anomaly
when the communication delay increases for different difficul-
ties without considering the time for a block to be decided.
Again, we consider the R3 Ethereum network with a total
mining power of 30 MH/s and an attacker owning ρ = 12%
of this mining power and delaying communications between
k = 2 subgraphs of half of the remaining mining power
( 1−ρ2 = 44%) each. The curve labelled 4 KH indicates a
difficulty of 4000 hashes, which is also the difficulty chosen
by default by Ethereum when setting up a new private chain
system. This difficulty is dynamically adjusted by Ethereum
at runtime to keep the mining block duration constant in
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Fig. 7: The topology of our experiment involving 15 miners
with subgraph G1 including the attacker depicted in black
and subgraph G2 depicted in grey
expectation, however, this adaptation is dependent on the
visible mining power of the system. The curve labelled 30 MH
indicates the probability for the difficulty observed in the
R3 Ethereum network. We can clearly see that the difficulty
impacts the probability of the Balance attack. This can be
explained by the fact that the deviation of the random variables
X1, ..., Xk from their mean µc is bounded for sufficiently large
number of mined blocks.
VI. EXPERIMENTING THE BALANCE ATTACK ON AN
ETHEREUM PRIVATE CHAIN
In this section, we experimentally produce the attack on an
Ethereum private chain involving up to 18 physical distributed
machines. To this end, we configure a realistic network with 15
machines dedicated to mining as in the R3 Ethereum network
we described in Section V and 3 dedicated network switches.
All experiments were run on 18 physical machines of the
Emulab environment where a network topology was con-
figured using ns/2 as depicted in Figure 7. The topology
consists of three local area networks configured through a ns/2
configuration file with 20 ms latency and 100 Mbps bandwidth.
All miners run the geth Ethereum client v.1.3.6 and the
initial difficulty of the crypto-puzzle is set to 40 KH. The
communication graph comprises the subgraph G1 of 8 miners
that includes the attacker and 7 correct miners and a subgraph
G2 of 7 correct miners.
A. Favoring one blockchain view over another
We run our first experiment during 2 minutes. We delayed
the link E0 during 60 seconds so that both subgraphs mine
in isolation from each other during that time and end up with
distinct blockchain views. After the delay we take a snapshot,
at time t1, of the blocks mined by each subgraphs and the
two subgraphs start exchanging information normally leading
to a consensus regarding the current state of the blockchain.
At the end of the experiment, after 2 minutes we take another
snapshot t2 of the blocks mined by each subgraph.
Table III lists the prefix of the hashes of blocks (excluding
uncles) of the blockchain views of G1 and G2 at times t1,
while the two subgraphs did not exchange their view, and at
time t2, after the subgraphs exchanged their blocks. Note that
TABLE III: Hash prefixes of the blocks of the main branch
(excluding uncles) selected by the subgraphs G1 and G2; the
blocks of G2 at time t1 do no longer appear at time t2
we did not represent the uncle blocks to focus on the main
branches. We observe that the blockchain view of the subgraph
G1 was adopted as the valid chain while the other blockchain
view of the subgraph G2 was not. For example, one of the
listed blocks viewed by G1 at time t1 whose hash starts with
0xfab2 appears as well in the final blockchain at time t2.
More generally, we can see that only blocks of the blockchain
view of G1 at time t1 were finally adopted at time t2 as part
of the blocks of the global view of the blockchain. All the
blocks of G2 at time t1 were discarded from the blockchain
by time t2.
B. Blocks mined by an attacker and two subgraphs
We now report the total number of blocks mined, especially
focusing on the creation of uncle blocks. More precisely, we
compare the number of blocks mined by the attacker against
the difference of the number of blocks ∆ mined by each
subgraph. We know from the analysis that it is sufficient for
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Fig. 8: The total number of blocks (including uncles) mined
by the attacker and the difference ∆ in the total number of
blocks (including uncles) mined by the two subgraphs G1
and G2 (error bars indicate minimum and maximum
observed over 10 runs)
the attacker to mine at least ∆ + 1 blocks in order to be
able to discard one of the k blockchain views, allowing for
double spending. The experiment is similar to the previous
experiment in that we also used Emulab with the same ns/2
topology, however, we did not introduce delays and averaged
results over 10 runs of 4 minutes each.
Figure 8 depicts the minimum, maximum and average
blocks obtained over the 10 runs. The vertical bars indicate
minimum and maximum. First, we can observe that the
average difference ∆ is usually close to its minimum value
observed during the 10 runs. This is due to having a similar
total number of blocks mined by each subgraph in most cases
with few rare cases where the difference is larger. As we
can see, the total number of blocks (including uncles) mined
during the experiment by the attacker is way larger than the
difference in blocks ∆ mined by the two subgraphs. This
explains the success of the Balance attack as was observed
in Section VI-A.
C. The role of uncle blocks in Ethereum
In the previous experiment, we focused on the total number
of blocks without differentiating the blocks that are adopted
in the main branch and the uncle blocks that are only part of
the local blockchain views. The GHOST protocol accounts for
these uncle blocks to decide the current state of the blockchain
as we explained previously in Section II.
Figure 9 indicates the number of uncle blocks in comparison
to the blocks accepted on the current state of the blockchain
for subgraphs G1 and G2, and the attacker (referred to as
‘Malicious’). As expected, we can observe that the malicious
node does not produce any uncle block because he mines
Fig. 9: The total number of blocks (including uncles and
non-uncles) mined by the attacker and the two subgraphs G1
and G2
Fig. 10: The depth of the blockchains mined by the attacker
and two subgraphs G1 and G2
the block in isolation of the rest of the network, successfully
appending each mined block consecutively to the latest block
of its current blockchain view. We note several uncle blocks in
the subgraphs, as correct miners may mine blocks concurrently
at the same indices.
Figure 10 depicts the creation of the number of mined
blocks (excluding uncle blocks) over time for subgraphs G1
and G2, and the attacker (referred to as ‘Malicious’). As we
can see the difference between the number of blocks mined
on the subgraphs is significantly smaller than the number of
blocks mined by the attacker. This explains why the Balance
attack was observed in this setting.
D. Relating connectivity to known blocks
Figure 11 illustrates the execution of two subgraphs resolv-
ing connectivity issues and adopting a chain. This experiment
outlines one of the fundamental aspects of the balance attack,
in which the chosen subgraph resolves the network delay and
attempts reconnection with another subgraph. At this point,
the subgraphs will initiate the consensus protocol and select
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Fig. 11: Execution where the attacker in G1 delays the
communication between G1 and G2 for one minute
the branch to adopt as the main branch. The experiment was
set up with two subgraphs G1 and G2 where |V1| = |V2| = 7.
The attacker selects a subgraph and delays messages between
this subgraph and another, enforcing an isolated mining en-
vironment. Once the delay is set, the attacker joins one of
the subgraphs and begins to mine onto the current chain. The
attacker then delays the messages until there is a sufficient
amount of blocks mined onto the isolated blockchain for it
to be adopted as the correct chain by the other subgraph. In
this experiment, at t = 60 s, the delay between subgraphs
is resolved, and the subgraphs maintain a connection. Upon
reconnection, the subgraphs invoke the consensus protocol
to select and adopt the correct chain. In this case, using
the GHOST protocol, the heaviest chain is selected for both
subgraphs, meaning the chain mined by G1 is chosen, to which
the attacker contributed.
This result reveals that the adoption of a chosen blockchain
is plausible, given that the attacker is able to sufficiently delay
messages between subgraphs.
VII. APPLICATION TO NAKAMOTO’S CONSENSUS
PROTOCOL
Although the GHOST protocol was shown to be less vul-
nerable to message delays than Nakamoto’s consensus pro-
tocol [29], it is interesting to note that our analysis can be
extended to Nakamoto’s consensus protocol. As described in
Section II, Nakamoto’s consensus protocol differs from the
GHOST protocol in the way a node chooses the current state of
the blockchain in case of forks. We present below an intuition
of the proof that the Bitcoin is vulnerable to the Balance attack.
As noted previously [29], [27] Nakamoto’s protocol suffers
from delays for the following reasons. Let us assume that p
pools of miners mine p concurrent blocks at the same time in
Bitcoin. Assuming that all these mining pools share the same
view of the blockchain with only a genesis block when this
occurs, then all mining pools update their local blockchain
view with a new block at index 1 that differs from one
pool to another. Finally, all miners exchange their blockchain
view and selects one of these views as the current state of
the blockchain. Consider that the process repeats for the f th
time, where miners mine concurrently, now at index f , and
exchange the blockchain view. At each iteration of the process,
the chain depth increases by 1 while the number of blocks
mined effectively by the correct miners is p leading to a final
blockchain of depth f while the number of mined blocks is fp.
Intuitively, this means that for an external attacker to be able
to make the system discard a particular chain, the attacker
simply needs to have slightly more than a pth of the total
mining power or the other miners to have a chance to mine a
longer chain than the other miners.
Theorem 5. A blockchain system that selects a main branch
based on Nakamoto’s protocol (Alg. 2) is block oblivious.
To show that the same result holds for Bitcoin, we need
to slightly change the Balance attack. While in Ethereum it
was sufficient for the attacker to mine on any branch of the
blockchain view of Gj after the block b2 (Alg. 5, line 15), in
Bitcoin the attacker has to mine at the top of the blockchain
view of Gj . By doing so, the attacker increases the length of
the Nakamoto’s main branch in graph Gj . Considering that
each correct miner mines at the top of the longest branch
of their subgroup with the same probability pi, the mean of
the number of blocks added to the main chain will become
µbitcoinc =
(1−ρ)tτ
2dpi . We can then define two binomial random
variables X ′i and X
′
j for the expected number of blocks in
the main branch of Gi and Gj , respectively, and apply the
reasoning of the proof of Lemma 3.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Traditional attacks against Bitcoin consist of waiting for
some external action, like shipping goods, in response to a
transaction before discarding the transaction from the main
branch. As the transaction is revoked, the issuer of the
transaction can reuse the coins of the transaction in another
transaction. As the side effects of the external action cannot
be revoked, the second transaction appears as a “double
spending”.
Perhaps the most basic form of such an attack assumes that
an application takes an external action as soon as a transaction
is included in a block [12], [18], [2]. The first attack of this
kind is called Finney’s attack and consists of solo-mining a
block with a transaction that sends coins to itself without
broadcasting it before issuing a transaction that double-spends
the same coin to a merchant. When the goods are delivered
in exchange of the coins, the attacker broadcasts its block to
override the payment of the merchant. The vector76 attack [30]
consists of an attacker solo-mining after block b0 a new block
b1 containing a transaction to a merchant to purchase goods.
Once another block b′1 is mined after b0, the attacker quickly
sends b1 to the merchant for an external action to be taken.
If b′1 is accepted by the system, the attacker can issue another
transaction with the coins spent in the discarded block b1.
The attacks become harder if the external action is taken af-
ter the transaction is committed by the blockchain. Rosenfeld’s
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attack [28] consists of issuing a transaction to a merchant. The
attacker then starts solo-mining a longer branch while waiting
for m blocks to be appended so that the merchant takes an
external action in response to the commit. The attack success
probability depends on the number m of blocks the merchant
waits before taking an external action and the attacker mining
power. However, when the attacker has more mining power
than the rest of the system, the attack, also called majority
hashrate attack or 51-percent attack, is guaranteed successful,
regardless of the value m. To make the attack successful when
the attacker owns only a quarter of the mining power, the
attacker can incentivize other miners to form a coalition [11]
until the coalition owns more than half of the total mining
power.
Without a quarter of the mining power, discarding a com-
mitted transaction in Bitcoin requires additional power, like
the control over the network. It is well known that delaying
network messages can impact Bitcoin [9], [27], [29], [15],
[25]. Decker and Wattenhoffer already observed that Bitcoin
suffered from block propagation delays [9]. Godel et al. [15]
analyzed the effect of propagation delays on Bitcoin using a
Markov process. Garay et al. [14] investigated Bitcoin in the
synchronous communication setting, however, this setting is
often considered too restrictive [5]. Pass et al. extended the
analysis for when the bound on message delivery is unknown
and showed in their model that the difficulty of Bitcoin’s
crypto-difficulty has to be adapted depending on the bound
on the communication delays [27]. This series of work reveal
an important limitation of Bitcoin: delaying propagation of
blocks can waste the computational effort of correct nodes by
letting them mine blocks unnecessarily at the same index of
the chain. In this case, the attacker does not need more mining
power than the correct miners, but simply needs to expand its
local blockchain faster than the growth of the longest branch
of the correct blockchain.
Ethereum proposed the GHOST protocol to cope with this
issue [29]. The idea is simply to account for the blocks
proposed by correct miners in the multiple branches of the
correct blockchain to select the main branch. As a result,
growing a branch the fastest is not sufficient for an attacker
of Ethereum to be able to double spend. Even though the
propagation strategy of Ethereum differs from the pull strategy
of Bitcoin, some network attacks against Bitcoin could affect
Ethereum. In the Eclipse attack [17] the attacker forces the
victim to connect to 8 of its malicious identities. The Ethereum
adaptation would require to forge 3× more identities and force
as many connections as the default number of clients is 25.
Apostolaki et al. [1] proposed a BGP hijacking attack and
showed that the number of Internet prefixes that need to be
hijacked for the attack to succeed depends on the distribution
of the mining power. BGP-hijacking typically requires the
control of network operators but is independent from Bitcoin
and could potentially be exploited to delay network messages
and execute a Balance attack in Ethereum.
The R3 consortium has been experimenting Ethereum since
more than half a year now and our discussion with the R3
consortium indicated that they did not investigate the depend-
ability of the GHOST consensus protocol and that they also
worked with Ripple, Axoni, Symbiont. Some work already
evoked the danger of using proof-of-work techniques in a con-
sortium context [16]. In particular, experiments demontrated
the impossibility of ordering even committed transactions in
an Ethereum private chain without exploring the impact of
the network delay [24]. As a private blockchain involves
typically a known and smaller number of participants than
a public blockchain, it is also well-known [8], [31] that many
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) solutions [7], [26], [20],
[6] could be used instead. At the time of writing, R3 has
just released Corda [4] as a proposed solution for private
chains. Corda does not yet recommend a particular consensus
protocol but mentions BFT and favors modularity by allowing
to plug any consensus protocol instead [4]. Our work confirms
that proof-of-work, besides being unnecessary for consortium
private chain when the set of participants is known, is not
recommended especially for dependability reasons.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we show how main proof-of-work blockchain
protocols can be badly suited for consortium blockchains. To
this end, we propose the Balance attack a new attack that
combines mining power with communication delay to affect
prominent proof-of-work blockchain protocols like Ethereum
and Bitcoin. This attack simply consists of convincing correct
nodes to disregard particular proposed series of blocks to lead
to a double spending. We analyzed the tradeoff inherent to
Ethereum between communication delay and mining power,
hence complementing previous observations made on Bitcoin.
There are several ways to extend this work. First, the context
is highly dependent on medium-scale settings where statistics
about all participants can be easily collected. It would be
interesting to extend these results when the mining power of
participants is unknown. Second, the success of the Balance
attack despite a low mining power requires communication
delay between communication subgraphs. The next step is to
compare denial-of-service and man-in-the-middle attacks and
evaluate their effectiveness in introducing this delay.
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APPENDIX
A. Analysis for the general case
As we show below, if the attacker can delay communications
for long enough between k subgraphs of the communication
graph where k ≥ 2 then the attacker does not need a large
portion ρ of the mining power for the blockchain system to
be block oblivious. We consider an attacker that can delay
messages of the communication graph G between k subgraphs
G1, ..., Gk, each graph owning the same portion 1−ρk of the
total mining power.
Similarly to Section IV, we consider that for 0 < i ≤ k,
each of the subgraph Gi mine blocks during delay τ . During
that time, each Gi performs a series of n = 1−ρk tτ independent
and identically distributed Bernoulli trials that returns one in
case of success with probability p = 1d and 0 otherwise. Let the
sum of these outcomes be the random variable Xi (0 < i ≤ k)
with a binomial distribution and mean:
µc = np =
(1− ρ)tτ
kd
. (4)
Similarly, the mean of the number of blocks mined by the
malicious miner during time τ is
µm =
ρtτ
d
. (5)
We are interested in measuring the probability that an
attacker can select a candidate blockchain among the existing
ones and make it adopted by the system. Note that this is easier
than rewriting the history with the attacker personal blocks but
is sufficient to double spend by simply making sure the initial
transaction that spend the coins is only part of blockchains
candidate that will be discarded.
The attack relies on minimizing the difference in mined
blocks between any pair of communication subgraphs. Hence,
let us denote ∆ the difference of the number of blocks mined
on any two subgraphs:
∆ = max
∀0<i,j≤k
(|Xi −Xj |).
To this end, we bound the difference between the number of
blocks mined in two subgraphs so that the attacker can mine
more than the difference.
Fact 6 (Bernoulli’s inequality). 1 + nt ≤ (1 + t)n for n ≥ 1
and t ≥ −1.
Theorem 7. An attacker decomposing the communication
graph into k subgraphs upper-bounds their difference ∆ in
mined blocks by 2δµc with probability Pr[∆ < 2δµc] >
1− 2ke− δ23 µc where δ > 0.
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Proof: This difference is less than 2δµc with probability
larger than the probability that all random variables are within
a ±δ multiplying factor from the mean, we have:
Pr[∆ < 2δµc] ≥ Πki=1 Pr [|Xi − µc| < δµc] . (6)
The probability that the numbers of blocks mined by each
subgraph are within a ±δ factor from their mean, is bound for
0 < δ < 1 and 0 < i ≤ k by Chernoff bounds [22]:{
Pr [Xi ≥ (1 + δ)µc] ≤ e− δ
2
3 µc ,
Pr [Xi ≤ (1− δ)µc] ≤ e− δ
2
2 µc .
Thus, we have
Pr[|Xi − µc| ≥ δµc] ≤ 2e− δ
2
3 µc ,
Pr[|Xi − µc| < δµc] > 1− 2e− δ
2
3 µc .
and with Eq. 6 we obtain:
Pr[∆ < 2δµc] >
(
1− 2e− δ
2
3 µc
)k
. (7)
As µc ≥ 0, we have that:
−δ
2
3
µc ≤ 0
−e−δ
2
3 µc ≥ −1
and as k ≥ 1 we can apply the Bernoulli inequality to Eq. 7.
Hence, Eq. 7 becomes:
Pr[∆ < 2δµc] > 1− 2ke− δ
2
3 µc . (8)
The next theorem bounds the number of blocks the attacker
needs to mine to force the system to adopt the candidate
blockchain of its choice.
Theorem 8. If the attacker delays the links of E0 while the
miners on each of the k subgraphs mine for
τ ≥ 3kd log(
2k
ε )
δ2(1− ρ)t
seconds, then with probability 1−ε the difference between the
number of blocks mined on the two subgraphs is lower than
2δ(1−ρ)tτ
kd .
Proof: The proof relies on upper bounding 2ke−
δ2
3 µc by
ε:
2ke−
δ2
3 µc ≤ ε,
µc ≥
3 log(2kε )
δ2
.
By replacing µc by the expression of Eq. 4, we obtain:
τ ≥ 3kd log(
2k
ε )
δ2(1− ρ)t .
Let us now bound the probability that the number of blocks
mined on k subgraphs is always lower than the expectation of
the number of blocks mined by the malicious node.
Theorem 9. If δ = µm−12µc then
Pr[∆ < µm] > 1− 2ke−
(µm−1)2
12µc .
Proof: The proof follows from replacing δ by µm−12µc in
Eq. 8.
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